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Enforcement and uncertainty in the management of joint fisheries 
 
Ole Jakob Bergfjord1 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to study government’s regulation of fisheries (or other natural resources) in 
the presence of the following two characteristics: 
 
1) The fishery is shared between different countries, so there is at least one other country 
also regulating the fishery. 
2) There is some level of political risk regarding future decisions in both/all countries, 
which is recognized both by fishermen and governments. 
 
The main question we study is how this political risk should affect the government’s policy. 
We focus on two aspects of government policy; enforcement levels and political uncertainty 
in own country. Our main result is that uncertainty about enforcement levels in the other 
country affects the optimal behaviour for the government in our country. If the optimal 
enforcement level in our country is a concave function of the enforcement level in the other 
country, uncertainty about the policy in the other country should reduce the optimal 
enforcement level in our country, which also implies that it is optimal for our country to 
remove more uncertainty about our policy than it would otherwise be. Conversely, if the 
optimal enforcement level in our country is a convex function of the enforcement level in the 
other country, uncertainty about enforcement in the other country should increase the 
enforcement level in our country, and it would be optimal to maintain a higher level of 
uncertainty about our own policy than otherwise. 
 
 
                                                 
1 ojb@hib.no, Departement of Economics and Business Administration, HiB, Pb 7030, N-5020 Bergen,                                             
Norway 
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Introduction and literature2 
 
It is often difficult for governments to regulate the extraction of natural resources. One of the 
main obstacles for effective governance is uncertainty. The uncertainty could be related to the 
actual existing amount of the natural resource, short and long term environmental 
consequences of the extraction, future prices and demand for the natural resource, and the 
extent to which the firms involved in the extraction can be expected to comply with the 
regulations. 
  Obviously, such regulation is even more difficult when the resource is jointly managed 
by several different countries. In the rest of this paper, we will use a fishery as example of this 
problem, but the analysis should be applicable also to other natural resources. 
 A significant literature exists on the management of joined fisheries – see for instance 
Bjørndal and Munro, 2003 and Lindroos et al., 2006 for reviews. Such fisheries are 
economically important, as well as challenging to analyse, because the two governments not 
are able to fully control or predict each other's actions (or lack thereof). Hence, game-
theoretical models of various types are also useful – see e.g. Sumaila (1999) for a review of 
some of the fundamental work here. 
This paper – and many of the references herein – is originally based on the 
Norwegian/Russian cod fishery in the Barents Sea, which is both economically important and 
controversial in some ways. The stock has decreased in recent years, mainly due to 
overfishing. The two countries agree on a total catch quota, which mainly is shared between 
the two countries (with smaller shares going to other countries with traditional interests in the 
fishery). Both the circumstances concerning the overfishing and the total amount of 
overfishing are, for obvious reasons, hard to specify in detail, but recently, Norwegian 
authorities have claimed that Russian fishermen are responsible for the lion’s share of 
overfishing, which Norwegian authorities in turn claim is possible because Russian 
enforcement of quotas and other regulations is insufficient. 
Even with this fishery as the starting point for our analysis, we will argue that many of 
the points are valid more broadly, both with regards to other fisheries and other situations with 
transboundary management of natural resources. Hence, we will not spend further time 
discussing the specific details and problems surrounding this fishery. 
                                                 
2The last half of this section is based on the introduction to Bergfjord (2009). 
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  The beginning of this section mentions several different obstacles for regulation. In 
this paper, we will study the effect of different levels of – and uncertainty about – compliance 
to regulations among fishermen. A large body of literature exist on the enforcement and 
compliance in fisheries, and although most of these studies are concerned with management 
within one single country, many of the same principles apply to situations with joint 
management. The early work by Becker (1968) introduces a basis for this branch of literature 
– that fishermen maximize expected utility, by choosing a compliance level based on a) 
expected gains from non-compliance, b) risk (or perceived risk) of being detected, and c) 
level of punishment if detected. Several refinements to this basic framework are considered in 
later studies. An important issue is how other factors than expected utility affect fishermen's 
level of compliance. MRAG, 2005 points out that compliance tends to be higher the more the 
agents trust the government – a rather intuitive effect. Hatcher et al., 2000 find that norms 
play a significant role – i.e., if fishermen believe others overfish or perceive the rules to be 
unjust, they tend to overfish more, whereas they are more likely to comply with their quotas if 
they have some kind of influence on the quota system. However, Hatcher and Gordon, 2005 
conduct a second study of the same fishery where “traditional” economic criteria appear to be 
far more important than norms. Kuperan and Sutinen, 1998 and Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999 
introduce some other factors of potential importance, including personal morals and trust in 
the scientific process behind the quotas, whereas Hønneland, 1999 develops a sociological 
model of compliance and non-compliance. With this in mind, we still choose to base our 
analysis mainly on traditional economic theory, where agents primarily act to maximize 
expected utility. 
  Although the issue of compliance is fairly well researched, less is known about how 
this is affected by political uncertainty3, i.e., the uncertainty about future political decisions. 
Political uncertainty has received limited attention in the academic literature, and what has 
been written usually concerns completely different areas than this. Often the discussion is 
more about how relevant risks should affect decisions (see, e.g., Arrow and Lind, 1970; 
Majumdar and Mukand, 2004) than about how the decisions themselves represent risks to 
agents. One main reason is, of course, that such risk is difficult to model due to the lack of 
good estimates of outcomes and probabilities. A particular problem is that political risk is 
                                                 
3Although «risk» and «uncertainty» originally described different phenomenons, recent literature seems to use 
the terms fairly interchangeably, possibly because very few (interesting) problems are characterized by risk in a 
strictly Knightian meaning of the word, i.e., with known states and probabilities. Throughout this paper, the 
terms are also used interchangeably. 
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more important in extreme situations, where no empirical data from relevant situations are to 
be found. 
 One area where political risk is discussed is within the finance literature4. However, 
studies here mainly deal with political risk related to investments in foreign (developing) 
countries, where different indices are used to estimate the risk in each country. These risks 
typically include risk of expropriation, weak property rights and legal systems (Clark, 1997). 
It is worth noting that these risks are comparable to the risks we study, and another 
perspective could be to establish “country risk indices” related to enforcement levels (or other 
factors of interest) in different countries. 
  Another main area for work on political risk is the study of the future for social 
security and pension benefits (see, e.g., McHale, 1999 and Shoven and Slavov, 2006). This 
area has become more important over time as more attention has been paid to the increasing 
pension obligations most developed countries are facing. Again, some of the literature here 
could be interesting if our problem is studied from another perspective. Both social security 
and fishery are areas where uncertainty occurs and has effects over time, thus emphasizing the 
need to include even the distant future into the model. 
  Finally, there is a relevant branch within the political economy literature (see, e.g., 
Persson and Tabellini, 2002 for an overview). Again, however, most of the literature seems to 
study how political decisions eliminate or optimally distribute risk, and less how political 
decisions introduce new types of risk. 
  In this paper, we will link political uncertainty with the issues of joint management, 
compliance, and enforcement, to study how the always-present political uncertainty affects 
two important policy decisions. 
 The first important decision is how the level of political uncertainty should affect the 
level of enforcement the government should choose. 
 The second important decision is if – and how – the government should treat the 
political uncertainty it itself imposes on fishermen. It is debatable to what extent this 
could/should be changed, but as we shall see, the perception of this uncertainty, both by 
fishermen and other regulating governments, could sometimes be important. 
 In section 2, we briefly look at the effect of political uncertainty on optimal 
enforcement levels. In section 3, we study adjustments of the political uncertainty associated 
with the government itself, before we conclude in section 4. 
                                                 
4 See e.g., Nordal, 2001 for a real option approach and Erb et al.., 1996 for a more practical study. 
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Political risk and enforcement 
A recent study of enforcement, using the Norwegian/Russian cod fishery as an example, 
provides some interesting results for this section. Hanneson, 2008 concludes that if the 
enforcement level in the other country is too low, this reduces the optimal level of 
enforcement in our country too. This result is fairly intuitive. If fishermen in the other country 
are free to overfish with no/low risk of detection, enforcement towards our fishermen will a) 
be costly, and b) lead to higher compliance among our fishermen, reducing total catch in our 
country, thus further encouraging overfishing in the other country as the stock grows/stays 
larger than it would be without enforcement in our country. 
 A question little discussed in the paper mentioned above is how uncertainty about the 
enforcement level in the other country should affect the enforcement level in our country. In 
other words: If the enforcement level (by some measure) in the other country is X, and 
analysis gives Y as the optimal enforcement level in our country; will the optimal 
enforcement level in our country be higher or lower than Y if the enforcement level in the 
other country is uncertain, but with X as the expected value? 
 
Figure 1: Optimal enforcement level as function of enforcement level in the other 
country 
 
The result follows directly from the function properties. If our optimal enforcement level is a 
convex function of the enforcement level in the other country, the introduction of uncertainty 
about the other country's enforcement level means that our enforcement level will be higher 
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than without the uncertainty. On the other hand, if our optimal enforcement level is a concave 
function of the enforcement level in the other country, our enforcement level will be lower 
than without uncertainty.5 It is not obvious which of these conditions hold, or whether the 
function in fact is either strictly concave or strictly convex. 
 
Adjustment of political risk 
Whereas uncertainty about the enforcement level in the other country might be important to 
take into account for governments when setting their own enforcement level, fishermen are 
often more concerned about the uncertainty related to their own government, in particular 
about future policy changes. Such uncertainty might be related to changes in future 
enforcement level or punishment, but also to issues not directly related to criminality (or the 
potential for criminality), such as quotas or quota structure or other regulations. 
 Bergfjord and Brandt, 2009 analyze a situation where agents' rent seeking efforts are 
related to the political uncertainty they are facing. They use the figure below to illustrate the 
trade-off between rent seeking and risk: 
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Figure 2: Aggregated costs related to political uncertainty 
 
In this framework, Π measures the lost utility due to political risk and x measures the cost of 
rent seeking at different levels of political risk. The total cost C is the sum of these two 
components, and as derived in the paper mentioned above, this sum can, under some 
conditions, reach a minimum at other levels of political uncertainty than 0. 
 In fisheries and other practical applications, this indicates that keeping some level of 
uncertainty regarding future regulations and government actions sometimes might be 
beneficial. Fishermen's utility is reduced, but so are their opportunities for various types of 
rent seeking, which in some cases will lead to a positive net effect. Two basic and intuitive 
                                                 
5This assumes that we choose the average of the enforcement levels in the relevant area. 
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static results are derived: More political risk is beneficial in a situation where this strongly 
discourages rent seeking, and less political risk is beneficial the more risk averse agents are. 
 The same model could be used in our setting with joint management. However, the 
government must now take into account how their actions are perceived by the other 
government. Based on the simple figure above and the result from the previous section, we 
get the following argument: If the function mentioned in the previous section is concave, high 
uncertainty in our country will lead to a lower optimal enforcement level for the other 
country. This, in turn, is usually negative for our country – if given the choice, we will usually 
prefer the other country to enforce as strictly as possible. Thus, in this case uncertainty in our 
own country implicitly carries a cost – the cost of lower enforcement in the other country, and 
the optimal level of uncertainty is moved towards the left in figure 1 – to a lower level of 
uncertainty than one would expect only considering risk attitudes and rent seeking 
opportunities. If the function is convex, we get the opposite argument. In this case, 
uncertainty in our country will lead to a higher optimal level of enforcement in the other 
country, which could be interpreted as a benefit from uncertainty. In this case, the optimal 
level of uncertainty will thus be higher than if one only considered risk attitudes and rent 
seeking opportunities. 
 
Conclusion 
We have found that optimal enforcement level and level of political risk – every things else 
being equal – depends on the relation between enforcement level in the other country and 
optimal enforcement level in our country. So far, so good. The key phrase here is, as always, 
the ceteris paribus condition. Although difficult to model, it seems reasonable to argue that 
several factors contribute to a setting where political uncertainty, compliance, enforcement 
and rent seeking are all related. 
 The first issue is the link between political uncertainty and enforcement. It is here 
assumed that political uncertainty is an exogenous variable, controlled by the government for 
instance to minimize the total cost of this uncertainty (rent seeking + lost utility from 
uncertainty). When comparing two different countries, it is unlikely that different levels of 
political uncertainty exist because the two governments consciously have decided on different 
levels. Rather, the difference will probably be due to real differences in government quality, 
where one country is unable (or unwilling) to get to the same low level of political uncertainty 
as the other country. In turn, one would expect that this quality difference also would affect 
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both the quality and cost of enforcement, which in turn would affect the optimal level of 
enforcement, and the optimal level of compliance. 
 The second issue is the direct link between political uncertainty and compliance. We 
have argued that uncertainty about political decisions in the future sometimes can be 
beneficial to prevent undesirable behavior today. Another effect of regulatory changes or 
uncertainty thereof is that the higher the political uncertainty is, the more likely it is for 
fishermen to misunderstand – or pretend to misunderstand – the regulatory system. This 
“confusion effect” could well be more important than the trade-off between political risk and 
rent seeking discussed above. 
 We have argued that, depending on the relationship between enforcement level in the 
other country and our enforcement level, it could sometimes be useful to increase the level of 
political uncertainty in our own country. This is also a result from Bergfjord and Brandt 
(2009), where rent seeking is the reason why it sometimes seems optimal to keep the level of 
political uncertainty higher than the minimum. However, based on the considerations above, it 
by and large seems like a good idea to stick with the traditional thinking – that reducing the 
political uncertainty is a good thing. If steps to increase the uncertainty is viewed as a sign of 
bad governance, rather than a rational strategy – which could very well be the case – the 
effect would be different from the original intention. 
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